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



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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

COMMAND LIAISON AT THE CORPS LEVEL

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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20 May 1983

ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

> Dealing with the enemy is a simple and straightforward matter when contrasted with securing close cooperation with an ally. By the same token no small part of our War College studies should be devoted to an endeavor to foresee exactly what to expect and how to reduce friction should we have allies, which may God forbid, in the next war.[1]

It is evident that in War World II "God did not forbid" what Major General Fox Conner feared in his above comments to the US Army War College in 1939 nor is it likely that "He" will do so in any future major conflict in which the US may participate. The key to successful coalition warfare rests in the concept of allied interoperability which, historically, has been accomplished through trial and error during the actual conduct of combat operations over an extended period of time. Successful interoperability is not magic, but differing national, political and strategic aims may limit the degree of attainment. In a sense, it is fortunate that NATO provides the allies with a peacetime framework upon which to build interoperability for to do so in conflict is a costly process in terms of men, material and time--items perhaps lacking in future wars.

The personality of commanders and their staff, coupled with preplanning, are the most important factors in establishing effective interoperability. Perceived characteristics of each national component tend to be exaggerated by other allies and, since they are usually somewhat derogatory, constitute a hindrance to real understanding. A spirit of mutual respect and cooperation must be instilled and maintained throughout the command.

Commanders must attempt to understand the political and military objectives of their allies which, while ostensibly the same, may differ considerably. Only personal visits by commanders and staffs will generally provide an assessment of these factors and a picture of the allies' capabilities. Time and circumstances may inhibit this process and it in this instance that liaison may assist.

Liaison, in the military context, is that personal contact or communication maintained between elements of military forces to insure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and effort. Liaison is aided; by the exchange of personnel, whose duties are to maintain continuously; by the exchange of information; and by the promotion of cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact.[2]

Liaison is, therefore, a vital function that assumes increased importance in the conduct of combined operations which, for future major conflicts, are the likely norm rather than the exception. However, the US Army has traditionally failed to recognize the importance of liaison as evidenced by: the lack of attention devoted in its doctrinal manuals; the assignment of liaison personnel with little consideration for the characteristics required; neglect of liaison training; and a general failure to appreciate the functions and values of liaison.

All too frequently liaison personnel are selected from "excess" officers or NCO's having no other specific duties. Many thus selected see their role as being nothing more than glorified messengers for neither they, nor those for whom they toil, have been impressed with the potential of the assignment. Often this lack of enthusiasm is furthered by the indifferent reception of the liaison officers at the receiving headquarters.

Compare this with the following excerpt from what is considered to be the "bible" on liaison. It refers to WW I and does not address US forces, but it provides an insight to the potential value of a liaison officer.

> Probably the officers who, without any direct responsibility themselves, most powerfully influenced decisions were the--liaison officers. They were often relatively junior in rank--but whoever they might be, their arrival was an event, and they were treated with the respect due to minor saints who, having access to the Supreme Presence, could intercede for or damn their respective congregations. I am convinced that in all cases they did their duty according to their rights, and reported as to whether the Commander-in-Chief's orders were being carried out in letter and in spirit. Knowing the Commander-in-Chief's intentions, they were able to interpret them; being young and agile they would go and see for themselves up to the very picquet line if necessary, and no one dared say them nay. They were the Commander-in-Chief's eyes and ears, and very useful the proved to be.[3]

As a former liaison officer from V Corps to CENTAG, the above represents the ultimate in liaison. Unfortunately, that status is infrequently attained particularly at division and lower levels where liaison is often of an "ad hoc" nature. Since others have recently addressed the problems of liaison at division and below, the thrust of this paper will be at the corps level and will address "command" liaison as the types of liaison are quite varied. Liaison between comparable staff elements of higher, lower, and adjacent commands is a normal procedure and it is also normal to provide "technical" liaison among and within branches, services and nationalities. To attempt to discuss the ramifications of the entire range of liaison is beyond the scope of this paper and would require a major treatise. Therefore, the discussion will be oriented to those liaison elements at the corps level designated to represent their corps commander with adjacent allied corps and higher allied headquarters. Although command liaison with a subordinate allied division may be required, it will not be addressed as it entails aspects of each of the ones to be discussed. CENTAG and V Corps will be used as the vehicles for discussion as this is

the arena with which the author is most familiar. Other corps headquarters and other theaters of operation may differ in specifics but the general thrust should remain true.

Prior to addressing the specific characteristics and responsibilities of command liaison, a fairly extensive historical review of liaison will be conducted as the concept of liaison and the means to accomplish it have evolved over the years. It is suggested that the following illustrative examples contain insights which could, and should, be incorporated into our current and future concepts.

DAYS OF YORE

In the earliest days of mankind and up until just a few centuries ago, there was little need for liaison. Combat was local in scope and tended not to entail extensive preplanning, movement, logistics, intelligence or communications. There was little, if any, need for a staff as the commander could generally observe the limits of the battlefield and could directly influence the course of battle. Since command was so strongly personalized and centralized, the commander's main need was a means to communicate his decisions and instructions to his units. The use of couriers to convey his directives is an example of liaison in a very narrow sense.

It is in the time of the Pharoah's armies that the first hints of a staff begin to emerge from the pages of history. Thothmes, an early Egyptian, referred to talks with his staff during descriptions of military activities. Thothmes apparently focused on intelligence and information gathering but it is interesting to note that some assistance was needed in the exercise of command.[4] The duties of the Egyptian "Scribes" can be

construed as liaison, although their duties were normally in the supply and transport areas.[5]

The rise of the Roman Empire saw an increased growth in staff responsibilities. Caesar's staff contained, among other, "Legati" who were assistants to the commander. These assistants were assigned by the Roman Senate or selected by the commander himself. Caesar strongly developed this old Roman institution as the Legati represented Caesar's authority with subordinate units.[6] For example, in his campaigns in 58 BC against Ariovistus, Caesar had a Legatus with each of his legions and one with his cavalry. At a moment of decision, Crassus (one of the Legati) directed a maneuver which forced the Germans to halt their advance and run.[7] Certainly Crassus was no mere courier as his actions demonstrated far greater responsibilities and authority.

For the next several hundred years following the fall of Rome, the general trend was retrogressive. The armies of this period reverted to the concept of individual commanders of small groups with little or no staff organization.[8]

1800s

The arrival of Napolean upon the historical scene created a rejuvenation of staffs, although his liaison concept was somewhat unique. Napolean used "aides" who were usually general officers and he often placed them in command. These aides were personal representatives and had a common unity of ideas with him. Since they were qualified to speak for him, Napolean sent them on missions to obtain information, to control the execution of his orders, and to shed light by their reports on what he could not see himself.[9]

For example, at the end of June 1803, Napolean journeyed from the Somme to Flushing, to oversee the execution of orders to the Camps of the Ocean. Subsequent to his return to St. Cloud, Napolean dispatched his aide-de-camp, Segur, on 23 August to again visit the Camps of the Ocean to ascertain the status of his orders. Further, he instructed Segur to "set down nothing by hearsay--see everything with your own eyes--say nothing but what you have seen."[10]

In another instance, on February 11, 1810, Napolean sent Lejeune on the following mission:

> Set out for Spain. See everything in detail. Men and material, and note everything. Return without loss of time and act in such a way that when I speak to you I believe I have seen things for myself.[11]

In contrast, there was no apparent similar mechanism by Napolean's enemies to insure a coordinated effort. During the last stages of the Napoleanic Wars (1814), Russia, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain (in the alliance of Chaumant) pledged to keep 100,000 men in the field until Napolean was defeated. No organization was provided to coordinate the efforts of this coalition effort. Heads of states of the nations traveled with their armies and held political and military councils of war. As he represented the power with the largest contingent of forces, Austrian General Schwarzenberg attempted to exercise some limited operational control over the armies of other nations. However, the heads of states of these other nations blocked his efforts due to differing political objectives. These loose arrangements enabled Napolean to defeat superior forces. While liaison alone may not have saved the day, the lack of effective, coordinated, united action by his enemies deferred Napolean's defeat for almost 10 years.[12]

In another example from this era, the chief of staff of the Tenth Corps detailed one of his subordinates to each division on the morning of the battle of Gravelotte during the Franco-Prussian War. These officers, accompanied by orderlies, were familiar with the operations of the day and were to report every important event that occurred. They were to serve as a double line of communication between the corps commander and his subordinate divisions on the theory that the division commanders would be too involved in pressing activities to communicate intelligence of vi impor-tance.[13]

Moving from the European to the North American continent, l s briefly examine liaison during our Civil War in which there are r ively few examples. In a positive use of a liaison officer by Lee, his Assistant Adjutant General (Major Dabney) visited one of Lee's divisions. Major Dabney found that Lee's orders had been misunderstood and immediately corrected the situation.[14] While Major Dabney was not an assigned "liaison officer," his actions in this instance certainly fall within the context of liaison.

On a less auspicious note, the lack of liaison may have contributed to the failure of the Union Army in the Second Battle of Manassas in which Jackson was able to escape the Union forces. Perhaps, if General Pope had maintained liaison with General Sigel, the misinterpretation of orders would not have occurred. Certainly the concept of liaison should not have been unknown.

WORLD WAR I

Perhaps the best recorded examples of liaison emanate from World War I. The very nature of its coalition type warfare would seem to demand extensive liaison at all levels on both sides of the conflict. The

complicated and difficult nature of allied interoperability was forcibly thrust upon both coalitions in the great campaigns of the war. In 1914 it had not been foreseen that these coalitions would exist for such an extended period. The short war mentality coupled with the lack of prewar interoperability planning and training exacerbated the impact of new weapons systems, large forces and limited geographical areas. Both sides proceded to learn the need for: extensive supply and logistic organizations; supreme command and direction; standardization of weapons and doctrine; and subordination of limited national aims to the strategies of coalition. Both coalition groupings faced the challenges of mutual understanding and the need for more complete liaison and communications systems.[15]

CENTRAL POWERS

While the Central Powers relied heavily on liaison officers, the informality of direction and looseness of their system was a handicap throughout the war. However, even when Germany enforced tighter controls, harmony did not always result. With Turkish forces in Palestine, the German General Staff virtually dictated all tactical maneuvers and Von Sanders remained an authoritarian figure in Turkey until the armistice. Most of the Turkish high command accepted German command of the Turkish units, albeit augmented by German and Austrian units, but resentment did exist.

Even with the more powerful members of the coalition, suspicion and distrust occurred at the top levels inhibiting a harmonious working relationship. To the Germans, it seemed that they always had to aid incompetent Austrians and the Austrians stewed under the German arrogance about the "sloppy Austrians." The Austrian Chief of Staff called the Marine

defeat by the Germans a "declaration of insolvency." He consistently regarded German liaison officers in his headquarters as either spies or "control" seeking to deprive him of freedom of action. His comment to General Sturckh, (fresh from visiting German headquarters), "well, what are our secret enemies, the Germans, up to and what is that comedian, the German emperor doing?" reflects a lack of confidence.[16]

A more positive note concerning liaison by the Central Powers occurred during the first battle of the Marne. Lieutenant Colonel Hentsh of the German General Staff was sent to the front with authority to order withdrawal of the entire Army if he saw fit. To paraphrase Caesar, "he came, he saw, and he did." The withdrawal was made--an example of liaison at the highest.[17]

WESTERN POWERS

Initially the interoperability aspects of the Western Powers had a distinct European emphasis. The major coalition partners were Britain and France although other continental and non-continental nations were involved. Therefore, it was necessary to overcome years of suspicion and distrust among former enemies. The American entry into the fray further illustrated the already perceived need to integrate differing force structures, doctrines and strategies, and personalities into a cohesive fighting force.

BRITISH/FRENCH

The most complete recount of liaison in WW I (or any other conflict for that matter) is that written by E. Spears concerning his activities as a young lieutenant liaison officer from the British to the French Army. In the preface of Spears' book, Winston Churchill quotes Field Marshal Viscount French's description of Spears' performance of duty as follows:

> I have a most vivid and grateful recollection of the invaluable services performed by this intrepid young officer. He is possessed of an extremely acute perception and is able to express himself and deliver his reports in the clearest and most concise terms. He is always exact and accurate and never failed to bring me back the information I most particularly wanted. I seldom knew him at fault. He was a perfect master of the French language and was popular with the Staff, and made welcome by the various generals to whom he was attached. His unfailing tact, judgement, and resources were very marked. His reckless daring and courage often made me anxious for his safety, and indeed he was severely wounded on at least five separate occasions.[18]

Churchill further describes Spears' contribution as follows:

> It was his duty to gain and hold the confidence and goodwill of the French Army Command and to preserve as far as possible in frightful circumstances their physical contact and moral relationship. The difficulties were enormous. That a young officer should have acquitted himself so effectively in the white heat of this crisis explains his rise from the rank of a sub-altern to that of a general officer.[19]

From a postwar perspective, it would appear that the British wholeheartedly supported the concept of liaison. However--it ain't necessarily so. The British did not dispute the value of horizontal liaison (keeping in touch with adjacent units) but the use of vertical liaison was not as appealing to the British commanders--they resented an officer from higher intruding into their commands.[20]

However, Spears and other were convinced of the values of vertical liaison. In Spears words,

> The Commander-in-Chief, the Army Commander, cannot visit all the units in an Army, yet he should know their temper and quality, and no report going through official channels can take the place of someone who has seen. A verbal account of a situation, the views of a quite detached individual concerning the mentality of a staff, a report of a conversation with a commander precluded by the situation on his front from reporting personally, often proved invaluable. I have seen the system working under all circumstances, and it is perhaps the only institution that survived the war without modification. Even when there was friction, and it is impossible to conceive of more friction than there was between Alexandre and the Commander of the Fifth Army, the system proved its worth, for fundamental misunderstandings, instead of being concealed, were exposed far sooner than they would otherwise have been. On the other hand, when there was

> complete unity of view between the higher and lower formations, the liaison officer perfected the accord, and by dealing with minor difficulties, helped the whole machine to run more efficiently.
>
> Throughout the war, the French liaison officer, flitting backwards and forwards with great if undefined powers, was an important figure. The junior officer in whom these powers were vested generally kept them carefully concealed behind the respectful mask of discipline when dealing with the Generals to whom he was sent, but all knew, and all bowed low, for even in the early days of 1914 it was realized that he would have the scalps of many wearers of gold-braided caps, since his comments would be of much weight in quarters where an opinion could make or break a man.[21]

One should not infer from the above that liaison officers were either omnipotent or omniscient. They had to deal with many of the same problems extant today such as communications, cultures, personalities and procedures. In a somewhat humorous vein, Spears concluded that:

> French and British kept apart, principally of course because they could not understand each other's language, but they had few common interests. Even food, an absorbing topic in wartime, did not bring them together, for they disliked each other's cuisine. When, owing to the sudden German onslaught on Verdun, the Tenth French Army was hurriedly relieved by the British, and during the movement the French Commissariat fed some of our men whilst we supplied some French units, complaints were endless. French and British both declared they were starved. Our people could do nothing with the vegetables for which they were expected to devise sauces. They hated the coffee and threw away in disgust the inordinate quantities of bread served out. On the other hand, the gorge of the French rose at the slabs of beef provided by us. They declared they could not face all this meat and clamoured for more vegetables, bread and coffee. As for tea instead of wine--puah! Had the arrangement continued it might have led to mutiny. Not that our men disliked wine. Soldiers in blue and soldiers in khaki had at any rate that taste in common.
>
> It was reported that the civilians, unlike the poilus, knew how to accommodate themselves to our rations. In some localities at least, a private wishing to enjoy the favours of a young lady, would hold up a tin of jam, and the formula "Mademoiselle, confiture?" became well established. This is the only instance I have to record in which the difference of language, far from proving to be an impediment, tended, on the contrary, to closer, more rapid, and generally to more satisfactory relations, in fact to better liaison, between French and English.[22]

It would be foolish to believe that such differences occurred only at the troop level. As rank grew, so often did egos resulting in an inability

to attain a meeting of minds--personalities intruded as did a mania for secrecy. In relating a meeting between Generals French and Lanrezac, Spears describes the impact of these factors:

> That none of the many competent officers who were at Rethel that day were called upon to act as interpreters at the main interview is another example of the fetish of secrecy. It was so generally accepted that secrecy was the most important of all factors, that it was applied against all the dictates of common sense. Upon this occasion the veil of secrecy was so tightly drawn that the chief actors were debarred from gaining more than an inkling, and that a distorted one, of each other's intentions, with the result that the plan of operations itself remained blurred and indistinct to those whom it most concerned.
>
> Neither the private conversation between French and Lanrezac, nor the subsequent general conversation between the Staffs, lasted very long: some twenty minutes or half an hour after Sir John's arrival, the two generals appeared on the steps of the Headquarters building, took formal leave of each other, and the Field Marshal drove off to Le Cateau via Vervins.
>
> The staffs of both armies were not slow to realize that the two men had not taken to each other. General Lanrezac did not disguise from his entourage his feelings towards Sir John, and I learnt a few days later at Le Cateau that Sir John had not liked Lanrezac.
>
> The interview had resulted in a complete fiasco.[23]

Spears had considerable to say concerning the effect of the desire for secrecy--he considered it a serious defect in the system both within and among staffs.

> Was it well, for instance, that the two most important sections of the Staff, Operations and Intelligence, should work in water-tight compartments?
>
> The French and British Armies were alike in this respect, and it did not require much foresight to make one realize that the lack of intimate collaboration between the two sections might prove extremely harmful.
>
> The pretext for the limitations imposed on the Intelligence during the war was of course secrecy, the fear that information might leak out to the enemy. In those days we lived a nightmare of secrecy. We may have concealed our plans from the enemy but we certainly befogged our own people. Allies did not communicate their plans to each other; different branches of the staff behaved as if each thought the others only wanted information for the sake of passing it on to Berlin. How ridiculous it all was!

> Experience has taught that however important it may be to keep information from the enemy, if this can only be achieved by keeping your own people in the dark, thus limiting their scope and fettering their initiative, then the price paid is too high. Better far to run some risk as regards the enemy than forfeit the homogeneous cooperation of all those on your side who must work in the closest harmony to obtain victory, and cooperation is impossible if some officers are kept in ignorance of their Commander's intentions. Moreover, suppose the enemy does gather something of our plans, he will probably be informed too late, and will certainly not know whether or not to believe what he hears, unless the information is confirmed by observed facts such as the movements of troops or trains spotted by his aeroplanes.[24]

A final example of his frustration with this particular aspect follows:

> One of my difficulties at the period was that General Lanrezac and the Operations Branch of his staff were very reticent, and it was often impossible to obtain from them the information G.H.Q. asked for. My frequent questions as to whether there was any change of plan invariably met with the same answer: 'General Lanrezac is carrying out with all celerity and dispatch the orders of the Generalissimo, which have been fully explained to and accepted by the British Commander-in-Chief.' In this matter I had no personal ground for complaint, since much the same thing was being said to the G.Q.G. liaison officer. It was merely that the dragon of secrecy was at work breathing out a fog of war, doing his very best to make it as difficult to know what our friends were doing as our foes.
>
> The mania for secrecy, for which the system was more to blame that individuals, did not affect the qeme Bureau of the Fifth Army, partly thanks to the broad-mindedness of its chief, and partly because the very essence of the work consisted in comparing notes with as many authorities as possible. But the frankness with which Commandant Girard treated requests for information was almost unique. Complete confidence between men of different races cannot be built up in a moment, and in these early days the French and British staffs did not yet have that confidence in each other that developed later born of their common misfortunes and perils.
>
> I remember reporting to my chiefs that at this stage of the operations something more than visits by liaison officers was needed. However often officers each aware of one aspect of the main problem travelled back and forth between the Fifth Army and G.H.Q., they could not insure unity of thought and action. They might arrange details, but they could not break down the water-tight compartments in which each staff worked, nor had they the authority to determine whether any fundamental divergence of conception, any change of heart or mind, had occurred in the commanders. A short note made at the time reminds me that I ventured to urge General Lanrezac to see the Field Marshal, but I

cannot remember the circumtances. It is evident that the suggestion was turned down.[25]

Compounding this lack of desire to communicate with each other was the difficulty in doing so when one wanted. In describing events on 22 August 1914, Spears could well be discussing a Corps or Army headquarters scene today.

> To the left of the church there was a convent, an arcaded building out of which a nun flitted now and then with downcast eyes and quick furtive footsteps. In this building, on the ground floor, the officers who had accompanied Lanrezac had found a room. The faces of all were furrowed with anxiety as they waited and waited and waited, with nothing to do and very little news. There were practically no reports, and those that came in were bad. Lack of information was exasperating, with the noise of battle growing ever nearer. Communications had apparently broken down.
>
> It was the old story: the divisions, fully engaged, were evidently finding it hard to give a precise account of themselves. We were up against one of the great difficulties of modern warfare. There we were, in a friendly country, with all the equipment of a modern state at our disposal, yet the Army Commander was without news of a battle in which two of his corps were engaged less than ten miles away. There could be nothing wrong with the system of communications, it was perfect and undisturbed; on the contrary, the peacetime postal system had been reinforced by all the technical troops of the Army, and civil intercommunication had been suspended so that nothing should interfere with military messages. Any amount of motors were available besides.
>
> The explanation? There could be only one, the difficulty subordinate commanders were finding in forming a clear idea of the situation of their own units. Time must pass before the Battalion Commander located his companies after they had been engaged; it would take more time to transmit the message to the Regimental Commander, who again would have to wait for the reports from his other battalions before passing them on to the Brigadier, and so on to the top. How much time must elapse from the moment when a runner from the company or battalion, dodging shells, ran back with a pencilled message from the front line, until a report filtered through the Army Headquarters? No one man could actually see more than a small part of the battlefield, and the Army Commander would only have to guide him reports of events long past. With these as his sole information he must deal with future events.[26]

For a liaison officer operating remotely from his parent headquarters, Spears writes:

> The sense of responsibility was overwhelming. A liaison officer, in those critical times when direct communication was impossible, often had to put forward an opinion as to what the future action of one Army or the other would be, and to give an estimate of its situation when hours had elapsed since there had been any news. Such an opinion as likely as not could only be based on previous experience, knowledge of a commander's character, or his own interpretation of events. He often had very slender facts to go upon, and the feeling that he might easily be wrong was terrifying.[27]

My final quote from Spears' book summarizes, at least for me, the way in which the system should work. The date is 1 September 1914 and Spears begins by describing the contents of a letter from General Maunoury to Sir John French and compares their relationship to that of General French and General Lanrezac.

> It will be perceived from the tone of this message how very different were the relations between the British and the Sixth Army as compared with the Fifth Army. General Maunoury was one of those rare leaders who at all times realized that his Army was not the only one engaged in the war, and that others as well as himself had their troubles and difficulties. His courtesy, fairness and desire to cooperate were greatly appreciated by Sir John French, who always did his best to meet Maunoury's views. Sir John had an innate sense of chivalry, a generosity to which it was easy to appeal. Of late his hostility and mistrust had been aroused, but these soon disappeared when the cause of them was removed.
>
> The human element, the personal relationship between leaders, plays a part in war that cannot be exaggerated. If commanders belonging to the same Army understand and have confidence in each other, so much the better the results they will jointly obtain. It is more difficult to achieve understanding and mutual confidence between men of allied armies who speak different languages and have a totally different background, training and point of view.
>
> To bring about such understanding and confidence is the problem of liaison, which, nominally concerned with the coordination of operations, is far more important as a method of interpreting commanders to each other. This is a difficult task, in which one generally gets more kicks than halfpence. The liaison officer has to stand up to both sides and defend the thesis of the one to the other and vice versa. He deals with all complaints. To one side he is always a foreigner. To his own people he seems to be forever taking the side of the foreigner. His life is spent between the hammer and the anvil.

> Whenever French and British commanders were "interpreted" to each other efficiently, and difficulties were not emphasized but studied and explained, misunderstandings disappeared. On the other hand, lack of understanding resulted in lack of candour and set up a vicious circle of mistrust. Absolute frankness on all points was essential to good relations, but this was difficult to obtain until confidence had been established.
>
> The greatest difficulty of all was to demolish the theories of the French as to how to treat the British, and of the British as to how to treat the French. To the more nervous French temperament the British were often exasperating, appearing stolid, devoid of imagination, and unwilling on many occasions to assume what the French considered their proper share of the common burden.
>
> Sometimes the French would sense an assumption of superiority on the part of their Allies which they found intolerable. On the other hand, they had to concede that the British were always where they said they would be, and that if they undertook to do anything they honestly endeavoured to carry it out. To the British the French often seemed unreliable. To be there one minute and gone the next suited their mentality but bewildered the British.
>
> My experience was that when French Commanders had to deal with a British General whose mind was subtle enough to match their own, or who had the chivalry of manner that appealed to them, difficulties would disappear as if by magic, and all the cards would be laid on the table.[28]

On one hand, I feel I should apologize to the reader for the extensive usage of Spears' book. On the other, Spears' book is the acknowledged most complete and detailed account of liaison experiences. It was felt that his insights were, and remain, extremely pertinent to coalition warfare and any paraphrasing would have been a disservice to Spears and the reader.

UNITED STATES

The arrival of American troops on the European continent further complicated the already existing interoperability problems. Allied commanders were faced with the problem of minimizing shortcomings in training and combat experience of the American Forces yet employing them quickly and effectively. This Great War confronted the Americans with the unique

problems associated with waging general war in which they were the junior partners of a coalition in terms of military experience and influence.

Attempts to overcome these problems occurred at all levels. At the upper end of the spectrum, General Pershing assigned Lloyd C. Griscom as the American liaison officer with the British in London. He was assigned to this duty as General Pershing's representative and authorized to speak for him. Griscom was sent to the US headquarters at Chaumant where he was thoroughly briefed on the activities of each department and section. He also visited unit commanders and during the course of his education, visited four battle fronts.[29]

At the lower end of the spectrum, "AEF instructions on liaison for troops" were published on 8 August 1917.[30] This pamphlet was a translation of the French official liaison instructions--as an aside, it was marked "Secret, not to be taken into the trenches," so its value is somewhat suspect. Throughout the AEF, allied interoperability and understanding were considerably enhanced as American soldiers profited from the French and British veterans assigned to American units as training and liaison officers.[31]

We tend to forget that the Americans interacted with forces other than French or British. For example, the inexperienced II US Corps, commanded by Major General Read, was attached to the Australian Corps for the breakthrough of the Hindenburg Line at Bellicourt in September 1918. Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, GOC the Australian Corps, describes the circumstances as follows and, from the magnitude of the effort, it is obvious that General Monash considered the integration of the American forces as an essential element for success.

> The Australian Corps had specialized in comprehensive and careful preparations for battle. Its methods had been reduced to a quite definite code of practice, with which every Staff Officer and

Battalion Adjutant had, by experience, become intimately familiar. All this procedure was a closed book to the American troops, and they were severely handicapped accordingly.

I therefore proposed to General Read, and he gratefully accepted, the creation of an 'Australian Mission' to his corps, whose role would be to act as a body of expert advisers on all questions of tactical technique, and of supply and maintenance. . . . The Mission comprised a total of 217 men . . . and consisted of specially selected and very experienced officers and N.C.O.'s. The American Corps Headquarters was provided with a Major-General, assisted by one General Staff, one Administrative, one Signal, one Intelligence, and one Machine Gun Staff Officer. Each American Division had assigned to it an Australian Brigadier-General, assisted by several Staff Officers; each American Brigade had an Australian Battalion Commander and Signal Officer; and so on down the chain. Each American Battalion, even, had four highly expert Warrant or Non-commissioned officers to advise on every detail of supply, equipment and tactical employment of the troops.

By such an arrangement it became possible to talk to the whole American Corps in our own technical language. This saved me and my Staff a vast amount of time and energy, because the members of this Mission acted as interpreters of the technical terms and usages customary in the orders and maps of the Australian Corps, which were necessarily quite unfamiliar to the American troops.

I entertain no kind of doubt that it was only because of the creation of this Australian Mission to the Americans . . . that the combined action of the two corps in the great battle of the closing days of September proved as successful as it did. Under no other conditions would it have been possible to bring about any reasonable degree of cooperation between two forces whose war experiences, outlook, attitude towards their problems, training and temperament were so fundamentally different.[32]

WORLD WAR II

Leaving WW I, let us now turn to WW II. At first glance, one would assume little differences in liaison requirements from WW I. However, significant differences did exist.

1. Integration of some higher headquarters (e.g., SHAEF) reduced the need for extensive use of liaison officers at those levels where several nationalities served together in the various staff branches and divisions.[33]

2. For the Americans, WW II was a significant departure from WW I in which they had been a junior partner. In WW II, as one of, if not the most, dominant actors on the scene, the US had neither experience nor theories upon which to draw or the way in which to be a "guider" instead of a "guidee."[34]

3. During the "Phony War," the Allies had an opportunity to improve the existing liaison network and staff work prior to the outbreak of full scale conflict.[35]

4. Until shortly before the war, Germany had no allies; therefore there had been no combined planning or training. The only information available to the German Army concerning their future allies was contained in attache´ reports which had a limited circulation. Therefore, the entry of the Axis allies required extensive "short notice" liaison efforts.[36]

GERMANY

Originally the German liaison system was organized solely to facilitate the German concept of command. Organizationally, the German liaison parties were small and were sent only to subordinate allied headquarters at army, corps, and separate division levels.

The failure to defeat the Soviet Army in the summer of 1941, and the continued heavy fighting throughout the fall and winter of 1941-42, soon indicated the need for the German command to exercise a greater influence on the commanders of the allied formations. This increased influence was to be exerted through their liaison system, which was to be greatly expanded in both size and mission. The following was taken from German reports dealing with the Italian Eighth Army. However, it also reflects the German approach to liaison used throughout the Allied forces.

1. Organization:

a. Field Army:

General Officer - 1 (Equivalent to Corps Commander/Field Army Chief of Staff in rank)

Operations Officer - 1 (Colonel, General Staff Corps)

Special Staff Officers - As required for Signal, Artillery, combat Engineers and Antitank Defense, each with a small staff

Necessary signal troops

b. Army Corps:

Liaison officer - 1 (General Staff Corps)

Translator/Interpreter - 2 (Recruited from Southern Tyrol region)

Intelligence Officer - 1

Intelligence Corps Troops - 1

Clerks - 2

Driver - 1

Signal troops - 2-8

c. Division:

Liaison Officer - 1 (Captain)

Translator/Interpreter - 1

Driver - 1

2. Mission:

a. Convey the orders of the German command to the various allied commands.

b. Supervise the execution of these orders.

c. Constantly inform the German command on the situation.

d. In addition the liaison officers were responsible for:

(1) Giving competent advice on the conduct of operations.

(2) Influencing the commanders of the Axis allied armies to act in accordance with German tactical concepts and keeping them informed of German experience.

(3) Reporting promptly on tactical plans and trying to modify them if they were misguided according to German views.

(4) Bolstering the Axis allied army's "will to hold out" and encourage tenacity through their influence on the allied commander.

(5) Arbitration of disagreements resulting from differences in concepts or diverging principles in tactics or training.

(6) Keeping close watch on the morale of the allied commanders and their troops.

(7) Checking requests for supplies to determine whether they were justified and appropriate.

(8) Protecting the interests of German troops assigned to the allied command.[37]

As a result of their early experiences in Russia, the German Army developed the following list of qualifications for a liaison officer (arranged in descending order of importance):

1. Tact.

2. Military skill.

3. Adequate knowledge of the character and language of the nation to which they are assigned.[38]

There had been no advance provision for such an expansion in the use of liaison. The additional liaison officers were selected from among those who had passed tests as interpreters, those general officers who had served in the Foreign Armies Branch of OKH (Headquarters, German Army) and those officers who had served as military attaches. Interpreters, with or without adequate military knowledge, were used as assistants. Although it

was found desirable to provide these personnel with at least an orientation course on some background and training, time and the press of operations did not usually permit it. The necessary personnel and equipment were taken out of the "hide" of the organizations in the field.

Past experience in coalition warfare had clearly indicated a requirement for a broad expansion of liaison services, but preparations to this end had not been made. Even though a greater influence over Axis allied commanders was obtained by this expansion of liaison services, mutual trust between German and allied staffs was difficult to achieve. The strain among the Axis allies could only be eased by the exercise of great tact. It could not compensate for the inherent deficiencies in equipment, organization and training which plagued the allied formations from the beginning. These shortcomings could not be righted because of almost continuous combat operations, although there were major attempts made to do so.[39]

ALLIED POWERS

Although the Phony War had provided an opportunity to enhance liaison and understanding among the Western Allies, the process was in no way complete. For example, the staff organization and operating procedures of the American, British and French units differed completely. The British and French knew no more of American organization than the Americans knew of theirs. Prior to the TORCH landings in November 1942, the US Army published a handbook on the British Army. The stated purpose of this handbook was to provide a simple guide for the US soldier cooperating with the British. This "simple" guide contained 375 pages describing in great detail the British Army, RAF and Civil Defense Organizations. It was also classified CONFIDENTIAL and had a very limited distribution. The great strength of

this manual was its glossaries, which covered US military terms and definitions with British equivalents and vice versa, RAF terminology and differences between British English and American English. There is no evidence of any further attempts to familiarize US personnel with the other national armed forces with which they would have to cooperate. Evidence that a lesson was learned here is demonstrated by the fact the G-3, European Theater of Operations, published a pocket-sized Notes on British Forces in August 1943. This volume was less than one half the size of the previous manual, and limited to information directly of value to those individuals and units engaged in planning/operations with British elements. In short, each of the Allies learned about the others' staff organization and operating methods through experience, with all of the attendant confusion, delay and acrimony that such a learning process entails, all under the pressure of on-going operations.[40]

With respect to operations orders, the format, terminology and techniques used in the preparation of these essential documents differed in many respects among the US/British/French forces although all contained the same essential elements. These differences emphasized the need for trained and experienced liaison personnel and for unit commanders who were thoroughly familiar with the military techniques and terminology of their allies. They could interpret their allies' phraseology and terminology and convert it into more familiar expressions and formats. This became particularly important at lower unit levels, where operations orders were habitually issued verbally.[41]

UNITED STATES

However, the Americans generally failed to exercise command liaison. The term "liaison officer" was present but generally connoted "messenger"

as seldom were these officers consulted by commanders at any echelon. Most were assigned to this position because their unit had little or no use for them.

An example of this short-sightedness occurred in Tunisia during the early period in which there was widespread integration of units. The presence of organized, trained and equipped liaison sections could have done much to alleviate the confusion created by the intermixing of units, communication problems (language and equipment) and differences in procedures.

Liaison sections, where required and not previously provided for, had to be improvised out of scarce local resources of personnel and equipment. Frequently, there was no attempt to provide or effect liaison between allied units which resulted in confusion, loss of time and combat ineffectiveness. In the rush to get on with the campaign, there was no attempt to work out or put into effect a coherent liaison system such as that used among the very same allies in World War I. The necessity for a widespread liaison system would appear to have been obvious, given the facts that: all the troops involved were, by and large, inexperienced; the forces of three nations were involved; and there was wide dissimilarity among the allies in organization, equipment and doctrine. The uncertain and shifting command arrangements obviously did not facilitate the exchange of information or enhance close coordination.

The language problem complicated the liaison situation, but while fluency in the foreign language was highly desirable, it was found not to be the prime qualification for liaison personnel. The following qualifications were found to be more important than language proficiency:

- Possess the confidence of the commander.

- Thorough knowledge of military operations, supply, maintenance, etc., depending on what the liaison mission called for.

- A keen understanding of the other ally's approach to the problem, his personal and national idiosyncrasies, working habits and probable reactions.[42]

The US 34th Division, as a result of their Tunisian experience with the British "phantom liaison" system, decided to form a similar system for use within the division. These special liaison officer patrols, termed "Phantom Patrols" by the British, were created to visit the subordinate headquarters and render special situation reports directly to the division headquarters. These liaison units were fully equipped and self-sustaining. They had no command function; they simply gathered and reported information. The US Third Army later used the 6th Cavalry Group in this way. A system of vertical liaison within that Army was also adopted from the British experience.

In the 34th Division, personnel assets were available because of the policy of providing assault divisions with officer and enlisted overstrengths. The division formed eight liaison teams, selected mostly from experienced field grade officers, which were trained by the division commander. This arrangement worked well and materially assisted the division in the conduct of operations.[43]

The main thrust of liaison efforts in the Italian area of operations was in the logistical field and at the lower unit level. However, there are some relevant points.

1. The nature of the terrain caused large scale operations to become fragmented into small unit actions. Therefore, it was not unusual for small units (e.g. separate tank battalion) to have six to eight liaison parties out at one time. Since they were authorized less than that, the extras had to come out of their hide.

2. Civilian presence in the battle area and the requirement to deal with the indigenious population increased liaison requirements at division and higher.

3. Most importantly, the US Fifth and British Eighth Armies contained a wide assortment of nationalities in their organization. For example, units of the following nationalities were attached or under the operational control of the US Fifth Army: American, Brazilian, Free French and Dutch colonials, Italians, and British Commonwealth/Empire representatives (South Africa, New Zealand, and India).

It became clear to all that one of the best methods of obtaining accurate, timely information was through the use of trained liaison officers and attempts were made to establish training programs for them. The US II Corps placed much emphasis on the selection and progressive training of their corps liaison officers. To highlight their importance in corps operations, a daily liaison conference was held by the deputy chief of staff of the corps, which included the corps liaison officers and staff section chiefs. At this meeting liaison problems were discussed, and the liaison officers were oriented as to the probable course of action for the next 48-hour period.[44]

In contrast to the European theater, the situation was such that the US did furnish liaison officers and elements through-out all echelons of command in the China-Burma theater.

In summary in WW II the US did use liaison extensively at the lower levels. However, with the exception of the China-Burma theater, liaison personnel were normally considered as glorified messengers. Let us briefly review our major allies use of liaison.

OTHER ALLIES

The British and French liaison systems differed little from those used in WW I. The British did introduce their "phantom" elements already discussed to overcome perceived shortcomings. Although information is somewhat scanty, it appears the Soviets tended to parallel the more restricted usage of the American Army by employing military liaison personnel as "couriers." However, some of the duties of the political commissars would appear to be within the scope of command liaison.

POST WW II

WW II was the last major conflict in which the US participated in a coalition effort for neither Korea nor Vietnam were "major" or "coalition" although Korea possessed some coalition vestiges due to its UN nature. The US was clearly the dominant factor in the Free World forces in Korea as it was in Vietnam. While command liaison was accomplished, there are few written references. However, the MAAG's and advisors performed duties encompassing aspects of command liaison and interoperability. The June 1983 Military Review contains an excellent article on allied interoperability during the Korean conflict. In this article, B. Franklin Cooling discusses the problems of liaison in such a multi-national endeavor in which so many nationalities were involved. Language was an obvious barrier even though English remained the basic UN language. Without rehashing the specifics, Cooling concludes that the liaison problems defied uniformity of solution throughout the conflict and the lessons of WW II tended to repeat themselves in Korea.[45]

The establishment of NATO and continued presence of multi-national troops in Europe have provided a unique opportunity to develop some degree

of interoperability in peacetime. While the interoperability process is by no means complete, it does represent the most that has ever been accomplished prior to conflict. How well the pre-planning will actually work will only be determined in a crisis situation. However, substantial efforts have been made throughout the spectrum of interoperability aspects.

In the area of liaison, STANAG 2101 has been developed addressing principles and procedures for establishing liaison. The most recent version was promulgated on 15 April 1977, but a revised version was being staffed during the 81-82 time frame and may now be published. The STANAG addresses in general terms the purpose, principles and procedures, details of execution, scope, and support requirements for liaison. One important aspect of the 1977 version was the strong reminder that, while liaison personnel may require visitations to their parent headquarters, they must not be misused for courier services.[46]

Unfortunately, the 1981 proposed revision deleted this enjoiner. While there were minor format and content changes, the other significant aspect of the proposed revision was the inclusion of an example check list for liaison officers detailing some of their responsibilities.[47]

In 1979, the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth published Reference Book 100-3, "Interoperability of British, Canadian, German and US Forces" in which the liaison concepts of each of these nations was reviewed. However, the focus was at the lower end of the spectrum--division and below although aspects were applicable at higher echelons.

During 1982, the Army Auditing Agency initiated an in-depth analysis of liaison in Europe. This author was unable to obtain a copy of the completed report. However, he was interviewed by the investigators and unofficial comments made by the AAA personnel during their visit tended to

corroborate those contained in RB 100-3 and a 1982 USAWC student essay by Lieutenant Colonel Jerry R. Rutherford to the effect that serious deficiencies exist reference liaison billets, selection, training and equipping.[48]

The situation is a little bit better at the corps level, for corps do have full-time liaison elements to their adjacent allied corps as well as to CENTAG. In at least one instance, one of the corps has a full-time liaison officer assigned to a subordinate allied division. At the division level and lower, such full-time liaison in peacetime is the exception rather than the norm and liaison tends to be an "ad hoc operation" when the need arises, (e.g. CPX's, FTX's etc.).

The reciprocal liaison between allied corps in CENTAG has been in being for a substantial period and is well established. On the other hand, formal full-time liaison from the corps to CENTAG was not established until June 1978. Full-time reciprocal liaison from CENTAG to the US corps still does not exist today. During exercises, USAREUR staff officers designated as CENTAG augmentees fulfill this responsibility. While no doubt they are extremely competent officers, the "turnover" of personnel and relative infrequency of exercises coupled with a lack of definitive doctrinal guidance certainly impacts on the quality of service provided.

The US liaison officers from US corps to CENTAG evolved from a series of letters between CENTAG and USAREUR during the 1976 to 1978 time frame. It was noted that both subordinate German Korps, the Canadian Brigade and adjacent commands (e.g. NORTHAG, LANDSOUTH, GTSC, etc.) had full-time liaison elements with CENTAG. In a letter to both V and VII Corps, General Blanchard (then CINCUSAREUR) stated

> I consider the assignment of liaison teams to appropriate US, NATO, and other allied headquarters to be a significant contribu-

> tion to the overall success of the NATO mission and a major step toward easing the USAREUR transition from peace to war.[49]

Having established the liaison billets between the corps and with CENTAG, what doctrinal guidance is available to assist the sending and receiving headquarters as well as the liaison elements themselves? In a nutshell--damn little! The most recent, and even earlier, versions of FM 101-5 and 101-5-1 contain little more than passing reference to liaison. One must harken back to the 1942 version of FM 101-5 for any definitive coverage of guidelines for, and responsibilities of, liaison teams. The STANAG certainly does not address it in any detail. Therefore, it is necessary for each headquarters to develop its own concept. The good news is that this approach permits flexibility and adaption to commanders personalities, concepts etc. The bad news is that this approach leaves much to be desired by all concerned.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Before addressing the specific duties and responsibilities of these corps liaison officers, let us look at what seems to be some prime characteristics of liaison personnel. These traits are listed in descending order of priority and, while they reflect my personal views, are pretty much substantiated in the majority of the liaison references.

Most important is the personality of the liaison officer (LNO). The LNO must be able to inspire and encourage comradeship, confidence and friendliness with the members of both the receiving and sending headquarters. He must establish his party as an integral working component of both headquarters. He must always respect the customs, courtesies and procedures of the receiving headquarters and use tact and diplomacy to achieve his

goals. Cooperation is the ultimate objective of all parties and, if personalities interfere, it is the liaison element that must change.

Second only to personality, is the military knowledge of the liaison officer and his party. They must have the confidence of both the sending and receiving commanders that; they are technically and professionally competent; they have a sound knowledge of military operations in general; and they have a current grasp of the specifics of their corps.

Next in importance is what I will term "initiative." This means the liaison party must actively and aggressively (but tactfully) glean information from all possible sources. Often casual comments will contain nuggets of information that may never appear in a formal report. Therefore, the liaison party must establish personal relationships with all staff elements and not be content to rely on formal meetings or reports.

The last significant characteristic is language and, depending upon the situation, this could escalate in importance. In dealing with adjacent allied corps, the ability to converse in the host language is extremely important, for it provides additional insights into their decision making process. At an integrated headquarters such as CENTAG, language proficiency is desirable, but not essential, as English is the "common tongue." To be sure, German language proficiency is a definite asset at CENTAG where German and English are the two major languages used. However, at other headquarters, such as NORTHAG where British, Dutch, Belgian, German and US forces are represented, most American liaison teams would not proficient in all the appropriate languages. Therefore, while language proficiency at these levels is desirable, it is relegated to a position of lesser importance.

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Having meandered through several centuries of history looking at "liaison," it is now time to address in more detail the specific roles of the players involved.

As mentioned previously, STANAG 2101 delineates responsibilities for the sending and receiving headquarters. A amalgamation of the promulgated '77 STANAG and the '81 proposed revision provides the following guidance:

1. The dispatching headquarters is responsible for:
    a. The selection, training and exercising of liaison officers in peacetime.
    b. Briefing liaison officers before dispatch on the latest operational situation. The briefing must give him a clear understanding of what information he is to impart to the receiving headquarters and what information he is to receive and convey to the dispatching headquarters.
2. The receiving headquarters is responsible for:
    a. Providing the dispatching headquarters with the time and place for liaison officers to report the point of contact and details of any tactical, movement or logistics information which may be relevant to his mission.
    b. Ensuring he has access to the appropriate officers to whom he should provide information concerning his parent force.
    c. Giving liaison officers an initial briefing and keeping them informed.
    d. Billets (to include erection of tents and/or assignment of tent space), when personnel of the host headquarters are provided with this service.

e. Office space, when personnel of the host headquarters are provided with this service.

f. Maintenance, fuel and lubricants for the transport of liaison personnel (the transport itself is normally provided by the parent unit).

g. Mess facilities.

h. Common supplies, such as small arms ammunition, stationery, heating fuel, maps and oter operational requirements.

i. Medical support, both out-patient and hospitalization.

3. The liaison personnel:

a. Must have NATO clearance for access to material of the appropriate classification consistent with their duties.

b. Should be familiar with operations of the parent unit as well as staff procedures according to the level of their host headquarters.

c. Should be fluent in the language of the host headquarters, or if this is not possible, should be fluent in one of the NATO languages.[50]

As an aid, the revised version contains the following example check list for liaison personnel. Unfortunately, the verbage conveys more of a "courier" tone rather than that of a true representative of the commander.

1. <u>BEFORE DEPARTURE</u>

a. Arrange briefing by operations/intelligence and other staff divisions as required.

b. Ensure arrangements have been made for transport, communications equipment, codes and signals instructions.

c. Arrange for the departure of the liaison team.

d. Route reconnaissance and time appreciation.

e. Obtain the correct maps, traces, overlays, etc.

f. Visit all headquarters staff elements and ask if they have any tasks.

g. Ensure you have your security clearance card, if required.

h. Decide how to destroy the information you are carrying in an emergency.

i. Know the passwords.

j. Inform your headquarters when you are leaving, your route and estimated time of arrival and, if applicable, your estimated time of return.

k. Pick up any correspondence designated for the receiving headquarters.

l. Carry out a radio check.

m. Ensure you are aware of any impending moves of your parent headquarters and the receiving headquarters.

2. AT DESTINATION

a. Try to arrive two hours before any scheduled briefings.

b. Check in with Military Police and complete any documentation.

c. Notify your own headquarters of your arrival.

d. Deliver any correspondence from your own headquarters.

e. Visit staff agencies and collect information.

f. On any traces put map scale, grid intersection points, date time group (DTG) of information, DTG received and from whom received.

g. Before departing, pick up any correspondence for your own headquarters and advise them of your departure and estimated time of arrival.

3. UPON RETURN TO YOUR OWN HEADQUARTERS

a. Deliver any correspondence.

b. Brief staff calls and write any necessary reports.

c. When reporting:

(1) The first essential is accuracy.

(2) Try to provide concise, complete and clear reporting.

(3) If you have to give information, the accuracy of which is not certain, quote the source.[51]

EXAMPLES OF CURRENT LIAISON ACTIVITIES

As illustrations of how command liaison is now implemented at the Corps level in NATO, the V Corps liaison teams to CENTAG and III (GE) Korps will be examined in some detail. Aspects relating to the USAREUR augmentee to CENTAG for liaison to V (US) Corps will be treated peripherally. Since the guidance to the III (GE) Korps liaison element to V (US) Corps is basically similar to that provided to his US counterpart, it will not be specifically addressed. The purpose of this review is to demonstrate that the current guidance to these liaison elements elevates them above courier status and establishes them as true representatives of their commander. V (US) Corps is not unique in this matter as all the CENTAG Corps have a similar approach.

CORPS TO ARMY GROUP

The following information is extracted from the V (US) Corps LNO Standing Operating Procedures dated 30 June 1982 written by CSM Dieter Post and LTC Jack Reavill. This SOP was compiled from a variety of written and verbal references.

1. Mission: To enhance the overall success of the CENTAG and V Corps missions and ease the transition from peace to war by ensuring mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action through close cooperation and coordination by the respective commanders and staffs.

2. Concept of Operations:

a. CENTAG Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) is responsible for coordinating liaison activities on behalf of the Commander, Central Army Group (COMCENTAG). CENTAG staff responsibilities in support of the Liaison Team are as follows:

(1) Furnish information copies of all messages and correspondence dispatched to V Corps. Although it is CENTAG's responsibility to keep the Liaison Team informed, the members of the team must aggressively assist this process.

(2) Coordinate in advance visits between headquarters by commanders/staffs.

(3) Provide invitations for attendance at weekly staff conferences, command/staff updates, work periods, and/or Commanders Conferences, whenever appropriate.

(4) Provide general support/services in accordance with CENTAG Staff Directive and STANAG 2101.

b. The V Corps Liaison Team to HQ CENTAG will:

(1) Perform duties as directed by the V Corps Chief of Staff.

(2) Represent V Corps at pertinent meetings/briefings conducted at HQ CENTAG.

(3) Serve as personal representative of the Commanding General, V Corps to the Commander, CENTRAL ARMY GROUP, as directed.

(4) Function as central point of contact for exchange of information between the headquarters staffs and their subordinate military organizations and activities.

(5) Maintain continuity in the exchange of information and promote cooperation and coordination of effort between the V (US) Corps and HQ CENTAG, and other organizations as directed.

(6) Coordinate activities concerning the General Defense Plan, to include allied neighboring elements.

(7) Provide advice and coordinate activities for and during bi- or multi-nation exercises.

(8) Support Project Partnership, mutual training matters, staff meetings and military working sessions.

(9) Coordinate social events, participate as directed, and advise on protocol matters.

(10) Upon request or as required, initiate coordinative action for the CENTAG headquarters, and other organizations as directed with HQ V Corps staff elements, subordinate military organizations, and other US para-military institutions under the support jurisdiction of the Commander, V Corps.

(11) Act as courier (not routinely) in lieu of established courier system.

(12) Be familiar with V Corps and CENTAG staff operations/procedures.

3. Team Composition, Qualifications, and Duties:

a. Liaison Officer:

(1) Qualifications:

(a) Lieutenant Colonel (05).

(b) General Staff experience at Corps and/or Army Group level.

(c) Graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College.

(d) Foreign language capability in German.

(e) Cosmic Top Secret Atomal security clearance

(f) Special Background Investigation is desirable for access to Special Intelligence material.

(2) Duties: The Corps Liaison Officer acts as the representative of the Corps Commander and his staff on a daily basis at HQ CENTAG. He represents the Corps at appropriate conferences and meetings and assists V Corps attendees at such conferences if required. He assists in the clarification of questions and the evaluation of problems at both headquarters which involve planning and operations for all staff sections. In such situations he represents and expresses the interest and views of the Corps staff. As a major special staff officer at both headquarters, he sits in on all staff meetings and attends social functions in his official V Corps capacity. He assists the protocol officer when distinguished visitors are scheduled to visit CENTAG from the Corps, especially in the area of scheduling and initial coordination. He keeps close contact with SGS at both headquarters to insure that he is informed of current happenings and also to offer assistance. He facilitates the passage of message traffic and normal correspondence, if required, between action officers at each headquarters. He reviews documents published at each headquarters and determines if problem areas exist and possible means of resolution. He is responsible for the overall welfare and management of the Corps Liaison Team. He is prepared to assist the USAREUR augmentee to CENTAG who has been designated to be the CENTAG Liaison Officer to V Corps during exercises and war in assuming his duties at V Corps.

b. Operations Sergeant:

(1) Qualifications:

(a) Master Sergeant (E8).

(b) Operations MOS.

(c) NATO Secret Atomal security clearance.

(d) Foreign language capability in German.

(2) Duties: The CENTAG Operations Sergeant (official MTOE title for the V Corps Liaison NCO) represents the Liaison Officer in case of his absence. The sergeant helps organize and coordinate conferences and visits to CENTAG by V Corps staff members. He cultivates good relations with members of CENTAG staff agencies and answers questions about the V Corps organizational structure and the Corps' major subordinate commands (MSC). He assists the Liaison Officer (LNO) with fast and accurate evaluation and submission of messages. He is the classified material custodian and as such insures that documents are maintained in accordance with appropriate NATO and US regulations. He is responsible for supervising the Liaison Team clerk typist/driver (includes individual training, and ensuring the team's sedan is properly maintained). He also takes care of company type administrative problems. The Operations Sergeant maintains and signs for all office equipment belonging to the Liaison Team. He is responsible for maintaining an action log during exercises. He participates in interoperability projects as directed by the Liaison Officer. He assists the Corps LNO in collecting, interpreting, analyzing, evaluating, and disseminating information to both corps and CENTAG agencies. He manages the day to day activities of the Liaison Team an its assets. He edits and prepares correspondence concerning all aspects of liaison administration. He performs further duties as directed by the Corps Liaison Officer.

c. <u>Administrative Specialist</u>:

(1) Qualifications:

(a) Specialist Five (E5).

(b) Primary MOS 71L20.

(c) NATO secret Atomal security clearance.

(d) Capable of operating and maintaining a military sedan.

(e) Foreign language capability in German.

(2) Duties: The CENTAG Administrative Specialist types all outgoing correspondence, ensuring that all the requirements of appropriate regulations and formats are met. This soldier provides for an adequate stock of office supplies at all times. He/she files, creates and retrieves office files. He/she answers the telephone and receives visitors in a courteous and alert manner. He/she also serves as the sedan driver for the Liaison Team, and performs first echelon maintenance on the vehicle. This soldier develops and maintains a cordial, efficient working relationship with staff members at all levels. He/she performs other duties as directed by the Liaison Officer and the CENTAG Operations Sergeant.

PEACETIME/GARRISON ACTIVITIES

During normal day-to-day operations, the V Corps Liaison Team conducts business as follows:

1. Visits: On a periodic basis, members visit each major CENTAG staff section to keep abreast of current and upcoming events. At least once a week (normally on the days the V Corps Staff Call is scheduled) members of the team will drive to Frankfurt. At this time any information copies provided by the CENTAG staff of messages and correspondence sent to V Coprs will be taken along and all concerned action officers at corps will be approached to inform them of any requirement with which they may have to comply. The main purpose is to insure that communications is established--message traffic is lost at times and correspondence may be delayed or

misrouted. Photocopies may be made at corps of NATO Confidential (and below) material by action officers. NATO Secret material will not be reproduced--action officers requiring such material will need to trace message or correspondence through the appropriate message center. The team's information copies will be annotated (on the routing slip) to show the action taken, prior to returning these items to the files back in Heidelberg.

2. Meetings: The Liaison Officer and/or NCO participates on a regular basis in the following meetings/conferences.

a. COMCENTAG Work Period: Once or twice a month, this work period gives the CENTAG staff an opportunity to update and brief the Commander and to obtain decisions from him.

b. Weekly CENTAG Staff Conference: The CENTAG Chief of Staff meets with his principal and special staff section chiefs once-a-week.

c. CINCUSAREUR's Update: The USAREUR principal and special section chiefs brief and update the CINCUSAREUR on all ongoing and upcoming projects and problems.

d. Weekly V Corps Staff Call: The V Corps Chief of Staff meets once-a-week with his principal and special staff section chiefs at V Corps.

e. Other: Any significant meeting at CENTAG, USAREUR, or V (US) Corps in which V (US) Corps interests are at stake. Examples include General Defense Plan discussions, Reforger exercises etc.

3. Reports: The V (US) Corps Liaison Team prepares the following reports.

a. CENTAG Annual Historical Report: On 1 April of each year, SGS CENTAG is informed by the team if a submission will be made.

b. Monthly LNO Activities Report: On the first duty day of each month, this report (covering the entire previous month's activities and key

upcoming events) is prepared in memorandum form for the V Corps Chief of Staff.

c. CENTAG (NATO) "Items of Interest" for V Corps Staff: This report is a compilation of suspense items, exercise dates, and conference data gleaned from information copies of correspondence dispatched by CENTAG to V Corps. This report is normally updated every two weeks and copies are then furnished to V Corps and CENTAG staff officers for information only.

d. Reports on Significant Meetings or Conferences: The Liaison Officer prepares such reports on an "as required" basis to the V Corps Chief of Staff in memorandum format to convey interesting news obtained while attending the CINC's Update, COMCENTAG Work Period, CENTAG Weekly Staff Conference, etc.

e. Other Reports: Any other reports required are usually announced in incoming correspondence. It is the responsibility of the Team NCOIC to take appropriate action on each requirement.

EXERCISES/TRANSITION/WARTIME ACTIVITIES

Much of the activities related to transition to war and wartime operations are classified. However, the concepts generally parallel those of peacetime operations. Some unclassified aspects of the concept of operations are:

1. Location of Team Offices and Hours of Operation: The team will be furnished office space by HQ CENTAG at any designated field location. Office space will usually by shared with the VII Corps Liaison Team. The team will normally operate at the main headquarters unless the CENTAG Command Group switches its base of operation to the alternate headquarters. The team is staffed to operate one shift only--from 0700Z until 1900Z (or

possibly later) seven days a week. Two shifts can realistically be set up only if the team is augmented.

2. Available Means of Communication: The team's main mission consists of solving problems between HQ CENTAG and HQ V Corps and to keep abreast of the current situation at all times. Principal means of communication with V Corps will be the TASS secure telephone in the team's office at the field location. Alternate means are: NATO Secure Voice Net (NSVN) available in the tactical operations center (TOC) of HQ CENTAG; a PARKHILL secure telephone device also located in the TOC; the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) terminal available in the office of the USAREUR Liaison Officer to HQ CENTAG; possibly the Tactical Computer Terminal (TCT) operated by the VII Corps Liaison Team at the field location if one of these terminals has been allocated to HQ V Corps; personal trips by the V Corps Liaison Officer to the HQ V Corps field location; or (in order to save some time) meeting the CENTAG Liaison Officer HQ V Corps at a designated point half-way between the field locations of the two headquarters for the purpose of exchanging information, and if necessary, documents. The CENTAG Liaison Officer to V Corps is a USAREUR (DCSPER) staff officer (normally in the grade of major) designated to augment the CENTAG staff during exercises and war. His principal place of duty is near the V Corps tactical operations center. Problems between HQ CENTAG and HQ V Corps are solved best by personal contact by either the V Corps LNO to HQ CENTAG or the CENTAG LNO to V Corps, as appropriate. Daily coordination between these two officers is very important.

3. Message Traffic: The CENTAG G1 Staff message Center (SMC) furnishes copies of some of the incoming message traffic in accordance with a distribution scheme on file. Input for this distribution scheme has been provided by the liaison team. At the same time information copies of

outgoing CENTAG messages will also be provided to the team in accordance with the desires of the message drafters. All of these messages will be picked up on a periodic basis from the SMC by the Admin Specialist or team NCOIC for review by the V Corps Liaison Officer. The team will normally receive only those messages and documents classified NS and below and these items are not signed for (not accountable) at the field locations.

4. Meetings/Conferences: The Liaison Officer should plan to attend both the morning and evening briefings by the CENTAG staff for the COMCENTAG. Important information and decisions should be relayed immediately afterwards to the appropriate V Corps staff officers by secure telephone. The LNO should also attend any other meetings and conferences to which he might be invited. During the day the LNO should visit the tactical operations center frequently to keep abreast of the operational situation, with special emphasis on contact with the V Corps desk officer. Contact with the general and special staff sections in the CENTAG headquarters should also be established on a periodic basis.

5. Coordination with CENTAG SGS: Special efforts should be made to maintain contact with the office of the CENTAG Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) to gather information on what is happening in the War headquarters. The team should be ready to assist the SGS as necessary with official visitors from V Corps units.

6. Logistical Support for the Team: The CENTAG Support Command provides the following support to the team at field locations: Sleeping quarters at a location removed quite a distance from the Primary War HQ (PWHQ); gasoline or gas coupons which can be obtained at the support site from the motor pool's dispatch office; emergency office supplies which are

provided in the supply store in the PWHQ; meals which are prepared in the dining facilities at both the PWHQ site and the support site.

CORPS TO ADJACENT ALLIED CORPS

The liaison established from V (US) Corps to III (GE) Korps will be used as a model. The major source of guidance to the V Corps officer assigned as LNO to III Korps is contained in a V Corps letter of instruction. Extracts of a 1982 version follow:

1. You are designated as the V Corps Liaison Officer to the III German Korps. In this capacity, you are the personal representative of the Commanding General, V Corps.

2. As the senior US Army representative, your mission is to act as an advisor to the Commanding General, III German Korps on all matters involving the US Army and V Corps. Your liaison office functions are an extension of the staff of this headquarters. Items requiring action by V Corps will be forwarded to the interested staff office with information copies to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The above guidance does not preclude direct coordination with any staff office for assistance and information.

3. Nothing in this LOI should be construed as limiting or restricting either your initiative in the performance of your duties or the accomplishment of your mission in the best interests of the US Army, the Commanding General, V Corps, and the command to which you are accredited. The following is a detailed list of liaison functions to be performed by the V Corps Liaison Officer to III German Korps. It is not considered to be all encompassing.

a. Represent the Commanding General, V Corps, in all matters arising between all US units and III German Korps.

b. Serve as the point of contact for coordination of activities of all US units and detachments with duty station with Headquarters, III German Korps.

c. Keep the V Corps staff informed on current and planned activities of III German Korps.

d. Assist commanders and staff officers of both headquarters in establishing and maintaining liaison with their counterparts at higher and subordinate headquarters, adjacent US/German units and US units attached to III German Korps.

e. Serve as the point of contact for all US out-of-sector and other support type units supporting or designated to support the III German Korps.

f. Assist special weapons units/elements in the resolution of problems which may arise in their support of III German Korps.

g. Assist, when requested by US or German authorities, in matters involving US uniformed personnel in the III German Korps area without infringing on national or command perogatives.

h. Keep the Chief of Staff, III German Korps informed of events within V Corps of interest to III German Korps.

i. Assist US officers visiting III German Korps, and when required, interpret and clarify questions which may arise during conferences between US and German officers.

j. Accompany German commanders or staff officers on visits to US units, when requested to do so.

k. Report to appropriate V Corps staff sections any difficulties existing with US units which may be in support of III German Korps, and if applicable, submit recommended solutions to the problem.

l. Act as a custodian for classified documents, up to and including "SECRET," and as the receiving agency for classified, and registered mail routed to III German Korps through US APO and communications facilities.

4. Policy Guidance.

a. You will make every effort to prevent possible misinterpretation of any correspondence between any US and German headquarters.

b. You will employ all means to assure III German Korps personnel of your willingness and availability to assist them with any problem they may encounter in joint US-German operations.

c. You will work to maintain and improve harmonious cooperation and coordination between US and German headquarters and units. Tact and diplomacy should be your guidelines in all dealings with members of the III German Korps.

5. Organization. The office of the V Corps Liaison to III German Korps is organized as specified below:

GRADE	PERSONNEL	REQD	AUTH	MOS
05	Liaison Officer*	1	1	13X54
E8	Liaison Sergeant*	1	1	11B5LGM
E4	Driver+Admin Specialist**	1	1	71L1LGM or 64C1LGM

* Must be fluent in German language
** Fluency in German language desirable.

6. Reports.

a. You will submit a monthly status and activities report to this headquarters, ATTN: AETVCS. This report, in addition to covering activities of the liaison officer of interest to this headquarters, should cover the following:

(1) Changes in commanders and key staff personnel.

(2) Training exercises/highlights of III German Korps.

(3) Any change to the General Defense Plan.

(4) Significant events, new concepts, and new equipment.

b. In addition, you will submit information to this headquarters as appropriate, keeping the V Corps staff informed on the current situation, organization and appropriate facts and decisions relative to the operations of III German Korps.

7. Logistical Support. TMP, Frankfurt, will provide transportation support on a dedicated, daily basis to your office. Other logistical support will be provided by Headquarters, V Corps.[52]

While one could prepare an endless laundry list of specifics related to the preceding examples, the flavor of their roles should be apparent. Although the extracts may not have fully demonstrated their relationships to the sending and receiving headquarters, in practice they are an essential element of interoperability and contribute much more to that process than mere couriers would. There are some fairly significant similarities/differences between these two types of Corps level liaison elements.

1. Similarities.

a. The composition and duties of the liaison teams exchanged between V (US) and III (GE) Corps are basically the same as that dispatched from V (US) Corps to CENTAG. However, the liaison element dispatched from CENTAG to V Corps is, as has been described, composed of a USAREUR augmentee. He is provided no NCO assistant and his driver serves in that capacity only (i.e. is not a clerk/typist).

b. The views of the respective LNOs are in accord with respect to visitation of their parent headquarters during exercises or in actual conflict. It may be summarized as a balance between the need to be "visible" at their parent organization and the need to accomplish their mission at the host headquarters. As long as secure verbal communications remain reasonably good between the headquarters, it is felt the LNO should conduct

business at the host headquarters. Only if communications fail, or some other extenuating circumstances occur, should the LNO's travel to their sending headquarters. Due to the distances and means of transportation involved and the limited numbers of personnel on their team, travel to their parent organization tends to take the liaison team "out of the net" for an extended period of time and encourages the view that they are couriers.

2. Differences.

a. As mentioned, there is no peacetime LNO from CENTAG to the Corps, although there are full-time LNOs between the adjacent Corps and to CENTAG. Only during exercises or war is there a full-time LNO from CENTAG to the US Corps.

b. CENTAG is multi-national in that German, US, and Canadian personnel are integrated on the staff. Liaison is provided to CENTAG from NORTHAG (a British officer who also represents BAOR), LandSouth (normally an Italian), II and III (GE) Korps, V and VII (US) Corps, 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, and German Southern Territorial Command. In addition, there is a French Military Mission represented at CENTAG. The operating language is primarily English and although German language proficiency is desirable, it is not critical. On the other hand, the situation at the Corps (whether US or German) is such that they are basically "uni-national." Therefore, it is more essential that the liaison officer at the Corps be conversant in the language of the host headquarters.

3. The Corps liaison officers to CENTAG also function as unofficial liaison to USAREUR as an additional responsibility. The liaison elements exchanged between adjacent allied Corps have no similar extra duty.

SUMMARY

After this lengthy review, it is now time to close with a few observations. In the past, the US has not used command liaison as effectively as have some of our allies. The US has tended to pay lip-service to the concept of liaison although there are a fair number of people, commands and activities who should be involved in the establishment of doctrine for, and the selection, training, and equipping of liaison personnel.

Even after thirty plus years of peace, we are still struggling with how to accomplish interoperability in NATO. Effective command liaison can assist in overcoming some of the inhibiting factors such as personalities, procedures, doctrine, goals, and general mistrust. In, and of itself, liaison cannot eliminate these stumbling blocks. In the final analysis, it is the commanders who must become personally involved and use every means at their disposal, including liaison.

It would appear that a necessary first step would be to establish doctrine for liaison. As FM 100-5 and FM 100-5-1 currently exist, they are of little real value in this area. If we seriously intend to conduct meaningful command liaison, it would seem appropriate to provide more guidance to the players involved. A recommended starting point would be the incorporation into the current, or next version of FM 100-5 the following extract from the 8 September 1942 edition, pages 31-34:

1. Selection of Liaison Officers.

The maximum effectiveness of liaison missions will be secured if the officer selected for this duty:

a. Has the confidence of his commander.

b. Is favorably known, either personally or by reputation, by the commander and staff of the unit to which sent.

c. Has a sound and comprehensive knowledge of tactics.

d. Possesses tact.

e. Has had experience or training as a liaison officer.

f. Possesses the necessary language expertise (if required).

2. Duties of Liaison Officers.

a. Prior to departure the liaison officer should:

(1) Become familiar with the situation of his own unit and so far as practicable with that of the unit to which sent.

(2) Ascertain definitely his mission.

(3) Insure that arrangements for communication (signal and transport) are adequate.

(4) Obtain credentials in writing unless obviously unnecessary.

b. On arrival at headquarters to which sent, the liaison officer should:

(1) Report promptly to the commander, stating his mission, and exhibiting his directive or credentials, if in writing.

(2) Offer his assistance to the commander, if appropriate.

(3) Arrange to obtain information required by his mission.

(4) Familiarize himself with the situation of the unit to which sent.

(5) Establish communications with his parent headquarters.

c. During his liaison tour, the liaison officer should:

(1) Further harmonious cooperation between his own headquarters and the one to which sent.

(2) Accomplish his mission without interfering with the operations of the headquarters to which sent.

(3) Keep himself informed of the situation of his own unit and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which he is sent.

(4) Keep an appropriate record of his reports.

(5) Report on those matters within the scope of his mission.

(6) Advise the visited unit commander of the contents of reports to be sent to his own headquarters.

(7) Make prompt report to his headquarters if he is unable to accomplish his liaison mission.

(8) Report his departure to the visited unit commander on the completion of his mission.

(9) Make note of personality traits, idiosyncrasies, etc., of key commanders and staff officers of the headquarters/units visited. This should remain CONFIDENTIAL.

d. On return to his own headquarters, the liaison officer should:

(1) Report on his mission.

(2) Transmit promptly any requests of the commander from whose headquarters he has just returned.

(3) Report on key personalities and general operations of the headquarters from which he just returned.

3. Duties of Sending Headquarters:

a. Give the liaison officer definite and detailed instructions, in writing if appropriate, as to the liaison mission.

b. Inform the liaison officer to the commander's plans, especially as they affect the unit to which he is to be sent.

c. Insure that adequate facilities are available for communication between the liaison officer and the sending headquarters.

d. Brief the liaison officer in as great detail as possible concerning the type unit to which he is being sent and key personalities he will encounter there.

It is also recommended that paragraph 3 of the above be modified to incorporate the appropriate STANAG 2101 provisions for the sending headquarters and that a fourth paragraph addressing the host headquarters be added.

While this step would certainly not solve the selection, training and equipping challenges, it would provide some direction to the liaison effort. It is recognized that scarce fiscal, personnel and equipment resources constrain commanders in their desire to fully implement liaison with properly trained, equipped and motivated liaison elements. However, since LNOs are a reflection of their commander in the eyes of the receiving headquarters, it is important that the sending commanders select their representatives carefully.

Within CENTAG, the subordinate corps headquarters do carefully screen their liaison personnel assigned to adjacent allied corps and to CENTAG. The assignment of full-time liaison parties to these headquarters has resulted in improved understanding, coordination and cooperation. It has assisted the process of interoperability by providing personal, as well as professional, insights, thereby considerably reducing "tension" among the headquarters involved. It is an activity worthy of continuation and improvement. As an anonymous author observed:

"Plan, train, organize
for interoperability--
or have it anyway."

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36. Ibid., p. 162.

37. Ibid., pp. 204-205.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., pp. 161-162.

40. Ibid., p. 96.

41. Ibid., p. 85.

42. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

43. Ibid., p. 92.

44. Ibid., pp. 113-132.

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51. STANAG 2101 proposed edition No. 6 Annex A.

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
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